Why Everything You Know About Ukraine's Spy Agencies Is Backward

Why Everything You Know About Ukraine's Spy Agencies Is Backward

Ukrainian intelligence is not swallowing the civilian state whole. The civilian state is hiding behind intelligence agencies because it lacks the institutional spine to govern in the open.

Read the lazy consensus in Le Monde and its copycats. A familiar melodrama plays out every time a drone strikes deep inside Russian territory or an official in Kyiv gets hauled away in handcuffs: the secret services have grown too powerful, and civilian politicians are losing control.

That framing is comforting. It is tidy. It is also analytically lazy.

I have spent years watching post-Soviet security bureaucracies from close range—reading leaked budgets, sitting across from defense analysts, watching procurement files vanish into classified folders, and seeing ministries blow millions of dollars on flashy "security reform" programs that changed nothing on the ground. When an intelligence agency looks like a rogue elephant in a china shop, look closer at the shopkeeper. Usually, the shopkeeper handed the elephant the keys because doing the actual paperwork was too hard.

The Myth of the Rogue Spy State

Conventional commentators treat intelligence as an external force that happens to politics. Like a storm blowing in from the Black Sea.

In reality, intelligence services are instruments created, funded, tasked, and—when convenient—weaponized by political actors. Calling them "out of control" misses a crucial distinction in security studies: operational autonomy versus political subordination.

An agency can run covert operations, deep-strike drone campaigns, sabotage networks, and counter-espionage sweeps with high tactical independence while still operating inside boundaries set by executive survival and wartime necessity. Confusing tactical muscle with political takeover is a rookie mistake.

Let us define the terms properly so we stop talking past one another:

  • Counterintelligence and internal security (traditionally the domain of the SBU): Domestic policing, counter-espionage, anti-corruption raids, and regime protection. Historically bloated, overlapping with prosecutors, and prone to turf wars.
  • Military intelligence (HUR): Offensive collection, special operations, cross-border raids, psychological operations, and asymmetric warfare. Built for speed and deniability rather than peacetime regulatory compliance.
  • Foreign intelligence (SZRU): External espionage and geopolitical collection—often overshadowed during total war by kinetic operations and real-time battlefield intelligence.

When a war drags on for years, the center of gravity shifts toward agencies that can move fast without waiting for three committees to approve a procurement line. That is not a coup. That is wartime bureaucracy following the path of least resistance.

Why Politicians Love Blaming the Spies

Watch what happens when an unpopular policy backfires or an embarrassing scandal hits the press. Civilian officials love to whisper that the security services acted on their own.

It gives politicians plausible deniability at home and diplomatic cover abroad. If an operation crosses a red line, the executive can shrug and point to overzealous operators. If an anti-corruption probe hits too close to an ally, politicians can complain about "unchecked security power" instead of fixing broken rules of evidence and judicial independence.

I have seen defense contractors and political consultants burn fortunes trying to lobby "the intelligence community" as if it were a single monolith with a unified boardroom. There is no single boardroom. There are competing budgets, rival chiefs, personal loyalties, and turf battles that make corporate politics look like a church bake sale.

The Real Question You Should Be Asking

People keep asking: Are Ukraine's secret services too powerful for Ukrainian democracy?

Wrong question. The real question is: What happens when wartime emergency powers meet weak peacetime institutions?

Any state fighting an existential war against a larger neighbor concentrates authority. Scholars of state-building—from Charles Tilly's classic work on war-making and state-making to modern civil-military theorists like Peter Feaver and Risa Brooks—have shown how prolonged warfare reshapes executive power, taxation, policing, and coercion. Coercive institutions grow. Oversight gets strained. Secrecy expands because operational security demands it.

The danger is rarely a dramatic midnight takeover by masked commandos. The real danger is institutional habit. Laws written for total war have a nasty habit of sticking around after the shooting slows down.

Imagine a scenario where a ceasefire or frozen conflict arrives tomorrow. Martial law lifts—or begins to unwind. Budgets tighten. International donors demand audits, open tenders, and civilian oversight. Suddenly, agencies accustomed to wartime speed, broad investigative reach, and classified budgets face peacetime rules. If civilian ministries still cannot run clean procurement, enforce court rulings, or manage public anger transparently, they will keep leaning on security tools long after those tools stop fitting the job.

"People Also Ask" — Brutally Honored

Do intelligence agencies undermine civilian control in Ukraine?

Sometimes they test it, yes—especially when overlapping mandates let different bodies chase the same targets or leak selectively to press outlets. Yet blaming every friction point on "rogue spies" lets elected leaders off the hook for weak parliamentary oversight, politicized prosecutions, and centralized decision-making. Control is a two-way street; weak principals produce either compliant rubber stamps or freelancing agents.

Why did wartime intelligence agencies gain so much prominence?

Because traditional peacetime ministries are slow, risk-averse, and tangled in legacy red tape, while asymmetric warfare rewards speed, secrecy, and decentralized execution. When conventional forces hit grinding attrition, covert strikes, sabotage, and information operations become high-visibility levers. Prominence looks like dominance on television, even when ultimate political authority remains concentrated at the top.

Can a country keep strong intelligence and strong democracy at the same time?

Yes, provided oversight has teeth rather than theater. Democratic control does not mean turning spy chiefs into timid clerks. It means clear legal mandates, real inspector-general audits, genuine legislative review behind closed doors, and strict limits on domestic political interference. Democracies with serious intelligence services—from the United States and Britain to France and the Nordics—rely on institutional friction, not wishful thinking.

Where the Contrarian Bet Can Go Wrong

Being contrarian is easy when you sit on the sidelines. Being right is harder.

Here is the honest downside of arguing that civilian weakness matters more than intelligence overreach: it can underestimate real institutional drift.

When security agencies accumulate investigative files, media leverage, special forces, and wartime prestige over several years, they do not just passively wait for civilian instructions. Institutional culture hardens. Informal networks form between security officials, business players, and political insiders. Even if no single general marches on parliament, a deeply entrenched security apparatus can quietly veto reforms that threaten its turf or budgets.

Downplaying that risk just to sound clever would be just as lazy as claiming the spies run everything. Both forces can be true at once: weak civilian governance invites security overreach, and prolonged security overreach further weakens civilian institutions.

What Actually Works Instead

If you care about healthy civil-security relations in a wartime or post-war state, stop writing op-eds about "spies gone wild" and fix the plumbing.

  1. Draw sharp lanes between policing, counterintelligence, and combat intelligence. Overlapping powers create turf wars, selective leaks, and abuse. Narrowing domestic investigative mandates to clear statutory crimes reduces political temptation on every side.
  2. Build real, non-partisan oversight inside the legislature and executive. Publicly screaming about leaks does nothing. Real control requires vetted oversight committees with access to classified briefings, budgets, and audit findings—plus legal protection for whistleblowers and inspectors.
  3. Audit wartime habits before peace arrives. Every emergency decree, classified contract, and special authority needs an expiration date and a transition plan. Waiting until a crisis hits to untangle wartime powers guarantees a mess.
  4. Strengthen ordinary civilian institutions. Courts, anti-corruption bodies, local governments, and ministries must be competent enough to govern without calling in the heavy muscle for every problem. When civilian institutions work, secret services stay in their lane.

Stop treating intelligence services like monsters under the bed. Fix the locks on the doors.

AJ

Antonio Jones

Antonio Jones is an award-winning writer whose work has appeared in leading publications. Specializes in data-driven journalism and investigative reporting.