Inside the Pop Mart Sales Drop as Labubu Fever Finally Breaks

Inside the Pop Mart Sales Drop as Labubu Fever Finally Breaks

Pop Mart sales have dropped by as much as 50 percent across key regional and secondary channels as the viral frenzy surrounding its flagship Labubu vinyl figurines cools off. For months, the snaggle-toothed forest monster created by Hong Kong artist Kasing Lung drove chaotic store openings, secondary-market scalping, and unprecedented revenue spikes for the Beijing-based toy giant. Now, the sugar rush is over. The abrupt contraction exposes a structural vulnerability that has plagued collectible toy makers for decades—what happens to a hyper-growth business model when manufactured scarcity meets consumer fatigue.

The Anatomy of a Viral Toy Bubble

Every collectible craze follows a predictable arc. You saw it with Beanie Babies in the late 1990s. You saw it with Funko Pops in the late 2010s. Pop Mart simply modernized the formula for the short-form video era.

The company built an empire on the blind box model. Buyers pay a modest retail price—typically between $10 and $20—for a sealed carton without knowing which specific variant sits inside. Chase figures, often seeded at ratios of 1-in-72 or 1-in-144, turn a simple retail purchase into a low-stakes lottery ticket. When BLACKPINK member Lisa began posting photos with Labubu bag charms in 2024, demand didn't just grow; it detonated.

Suddenly, a niche designer toy became a mandatory luxury accessory. Consumers weren't buying vinyl figures anymore. They were buying social currency.

When demand spikes that violently, retail infrastructure breaks down. Pop Mart's physical stores and vending machines—known as Robo Shops—were stripped bare within minutes of restocks. Automated bots dominated online drops. Secondary marketplaces like StockX, Xianyu, and eBay saw standard $15 plush pendants flipping for upwards of $100, while rare secret editions commanded several hundred dollars. On paper, Pop Mart looked unstoppable. In reality, the brand was losing control of its own supply chain and pricing power.

Why the 50 Percent Drop Happened So Fast

A 50 percent sales plunge sounds catastrophic, yet anyone who tracks consumer hype cycles saw the warning signs months ago. Three distinct forces collided to puncture the Labubu bubble.

Supply Catch-Up Killed the Thrill

Scarcity is the oxygen of the designer toy market. If everyone on the subway has the same rare bag charm, the charm loses its status value overnight.

Faced with massive backorders and angry retail customers, Pop Mart did what any publicly traded company under pressure from shareholders would do. It ramped up production. Factories in southern China churned out millions of additional units across new series like Exciting Macaron and Have a Seat.

At first, the market absorbed the extra inventory. Then, the tipping point arrived. Once supply caught up to organic demand, secondary market premiums evaporated. Resellers—who had been artificially inflating retail sales by buying up entire store allocations—abandoned the product almost simultaneously. When the flippers walk away, retail volume falls off a cliff. A significant portion of Pop Mart's peak sales never represented true end-consumer demand; it was speculative inventory hoarding.

The Fatigue of Endless Variations

Designer toys rely on artistic novelty. Once a character becomes a corporate cash cow, creative discipline usually goes out the window.

Instead of letting Labubu breathe, Pop Mart flooded its catalog with endless iterations. Seasonal editions, regional exclusives, oversized vinyls, plush keychains, phone cases, and cross-brand collaborations arrived in relentless waves. Collectors who initially enjoyed hunting down a complete set of twelve figures suddenly found themselves facing dozens of releases every quarter.

Completing a collection became financially exhausting. Rather than scaling back their spending, many core collectors simply quit. In the hobbyist world, breaking the completionist habit is fatal for a brand. Once a buyer skips two or three drops in a row, the psychological spell of the blind box breaks.

Macro Pressures on Discretionary Spending

The timing could not have been worse. Across mainland China—still Pop Mart's foundational revenue engine—and increasingly in Western markets, consumers are tightening their belts on non-essential goods.

Economists often talk about the lipstick effect, the theory that shoppers buy small, affordable luxuries during economic downturns because they cannot afford big-ticket items. Blind boxes initially benefited from this trend. A $15 toy feels harmless compared to a $3,000 handbag.

However, blind boxes are inherently repetitive purchases. Buying one box rarely satisfies the itch; buyers purchase whole trays of six or twelve to secure the design they actually want. Spending $150 a month on plastic figurines quickly stops feeling like a cheap thrill when household budgets face real pressure. Shoppers began questioning the intrinsic value of mass-produced vinyl, and the answer wasn't flattering.

The Blind Box Trap and Inventory Hangover

To understand why Pop Mart's numbers swing so violently, you have to look at how blind box economics operate behind the scenes.

Traditional toy companies sell recognizable characters backed by multi-year media franchises. Think of Disney, Mattel, or Hasbro. A child asks for a specific action figure because they watched a movie or a Saturday morning cartoon. Demand is relatively steady, forecastable, and tied to narrative storytelling.

Pop Mart operates without a traditional media safety net. Characters like Molly, Skullpanda, Dimoo, and Labubu have almost no narrative backstory. They exist purely as visual aesthetics. Because there is no movie release or television show driving sustained emotional attachment, Pop Mart has to manufacture urgency through artificial supply constraints and constant novelty.

Consider a hypothetical scenario to see how fragile this model becomes during a downturn. Imagine a specialty retailer orders 10,000 blind boxes based on peak hype metrics from the previous quarter. By the time those boxes ship from the factory, clear customs, and hit shelves, the social media trend has moved on. Because the product relies on trend momentum rather than timeless character appeal, the retailer cannot easily clear that dead stock without heavy discounting. And in the collectible world, putting a product on the clearance rack destroys its brand equity permanently. Nobody wants to pay full price for a "rare" collectible after seeing its cousins marked down 60 percent in a bargain bin.

Global Expansion Meets Local Reality

As domestic growth in China began showing signs of saturation, Pop Mart bet its future on aggressive international expansion. Flagship stores opened in high-rent districts across London, Paris, Tokyo, Seoul, New York, and Los Angeles. For a brief window, Labubu carried that expansion on its back.

The international surge masked underlying weaknesses. Western consumers interacted with Labubu very differently than long-time Asian designer toy collectors. In cities like Los Angeles or London, buyers largely treated Labubu as a standalone fashion fad—an accessory to clip onto a designer tote bag for a single season. They were not buying into the broader Pop Mart ecosystem. They didn't care about the company's other intellectual properties, nor did they download the Pop Mart app to engage with its loyalty programs.

When a fashion trend passes in Western markets, shoppers don't pivot to another character from the same toy manufacturer. They just move on to the next viral accessory. Pop Mart spent millions securing prime global real estate to capture a wave that proved far shallower than executives anticipated. Now, those expensive brick-and-mortar storefronts have to pay their rent without a runaway viral hit pulling foot traffic through the front doors.

What History Tells Us About Collectibles

Pop Mart executives frequently compare their company to Sanrio, the Japanese powerhouse behind Hello Kitty. It is an ambitious comparison, and a deeply flawed one.

Sanrio spent fifty years building Hello Kitty into a cultural institution that transcends generations. The company survived multiple crashes by licensing its characters across thousands of functional everyday categories—from stationery and kitchen appliances to theme parks and airlines—rather than relying on speculative blind-box mechanics.

Pop Mart's current predicament looks much closer to the trajectory of Funko between 2022 and 2023. During the pandemic, Funko rode a massive wave of collectible enthusiasm. Executives mistook temporary hype for permanent baseline demand, over-ordered inventory, and expanded warehousing aggressively. When consumer interest cooled, Funko was left sitting on tens of millions of dollars in unsold vinyl figures—so much excess stock that the company famously wrote down over $30 million worth of inventory and sent it straight to a landfill.

The lesson from Funko, Beanie Babies, and sports cards in the 1990s is absolute: you cannot scale scarcity. The moment a collectible company tries to satisfy mass-market demand, it destroys the exact psychological trigger that made the product desirable in the first place.

Can Pop Mart Stabilize Without Another Viral Hit

A 50 percent drop in sales does not mean Pop Mart is going out of business. The company still sits on substantial cash reserves, maintains high gross margins on the toys it does sell, and commands one of the most sophisticated direct-to-consumer retail networks in Asia.

However, the era of effortless exponential growth is finished. To survive the post-Labubu reality, Pop Mart has to fundamentally rewire how it measures success and manages its intellectual property.

First, the company must voluntarily choke off supply again. Accepting lower top-line revenue in exchange for restored brand prestige is a bitter pill for public market investors, yet it remains the only proven way to keep a designer toy brand alive. Restoring secondary market health—where collectors feel confident their purchases hold some degree of value—is non-negotiable.

Second, Pop Mart needs to give its artists room to create genuine art again rather than treating them like assembly-line workers. Kasing Lung's original illustrations for The Monsters series had a gritty, melancholic charm rooted in Nordic folklore. Turning that vision into a pastel-colored mass-market plush factory diluted what made Labubu special.

Finally, the company has to prove it can build emotional depth around its characters. Pop Mart has recently dabbled in mobile gaming and small-scale theme park attractions in Beijing. Those ventures are expensive and slow to generate returns, yet they represent the only viable bridge between a passing fad and a lasting entertainment brand.

For now, the lines outside Pop Mart stores are shorter. The resale forums are quiet, flooded with sellers desperately trying to offload unopened cases at retail cost just to break even. The market has delivered its verdict on manufactured hype, leaving Pop Mart with the hardest job in the toy business—convincing customers to care once the craze is gone.

SJ

Sofia James

With a background in both technology and communication, Sofia James excels at explaining complex digital trends to everyday readers.